This paper contrasts the costs and benefits of leasing, rather than owning real estate assets.
Introduction
Previous studies have identified a number of motivations for leasing rather than owning an asset. For example, companies are found to lease to avoid debt financing (e.g., Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) , Ang and Peterson (1984) , and Marston and Harris (1988) ), to obtain a lower cost of financing by passing the tax allowances the company cannot claim when buying the asset to the lessor (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) , Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) , and Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1996) ) and to mitigate the agency conflicts, namely the asset substitution problem (e.g., Stulz and Johnson (1985) , and Smith and Wakeman (1985) ). The overall empirical evidence is however mixed. For example, Bathala and Mukherjee (1995) , and Krishnan and Moyer (1994) find that leasing is a complement, not a substitute, to debt financing and Lasfer and Levis (1998) show that leasing is substitute for debt financing and is driven by taxes for large companies only.
The purpose of this paper is to extend this research to cover specifically the leasing of real estate assets (property) where the research is lacking. I document the costs and benefits of leasing rather than owning freehold property and assess the extent to which companies generate higher or lower returns to their shareholders by leasing property. The main argument tested in this paper is that leasing is beneficial as it allows companies to finance their growth opportunities, have a lower level of debt when leasing is reported as off-balance sheet financing, obtain lower rental costs when they pass on capital allowances to the lessor, and increase their efficiency by treating property as a cost asset. However, leasing is costly. By leasing rather than owning property, companies lose their ability to reduce their cost of debt through collateral and increase the risk of bankruptcy and associated costs because leasing has the highest priority structure. 1 I hypothesize that, if companies take into account the costs and benefits of leasing, they are expected to aim for an optimal level of property ownership.
This hypothesis is tested using a total of 2,343 UK quoted companies over the period 1989 to 2002, resulting in 17,862 pooled time-series and cross-sectional observations.
Financial companies are excluded because of their specific characteristics. To avoid survivorship bias, companies that are currently trading as well as companies that were delisted over the sample period after becoming insolvent or being taken over are included in the sample. The tests are undertaken for the sample as a whole and by splitting companies in the sample into various sub-sample periods, sectors and size groups.
The analysis centers mainly on the leasing propensity defined as the ratio of leased property (leasehold property plus present value of operating leases on property) as a proportion of total property (leased property plus freehold property). The leasing propensity of firms that report only freehold property is zero, while the leasing propensity of companies that report only leased property, in the form of either leasehold property or operating leases on property, is equal to 1. The remaining companies are classified into quintiles according to the level of their leasing propensity. I first compare the financial characteristics of the two extreme groups: companies that report only freehold property against those that report only leased property, in a univariate analysis. Then I run a set of regressions to capture the joint effects of all the financial characteristics, including size and industry factors, on the different levels of the leasing propensity.
The results show that companies lease their property to reduce their debt, to finance their growth prospects, to pass on the tax allowances to the lessors and to conserve liquidity, namely cash. These findings suggest that the decision to lease property is driven by strategic considerations. The results also indicate that leasing allows companies to use their property more efficiently as they hold less stock than companies that report only freehold property. The market appears to value the benefits of leasing property. Companies that report 100% leased property are found to generate higher total returns to their shareholders than companies that report only freehold property. However, these 100% leased property companies do not generate the highest returns. I find that the relationship between firm value as measured market-to-book and leasing propensity is curve linear optimized at about 65%, after accounting for firm size, leverage, industry and other relevant factors. These results are strong to alternative measures of firm value or leasing and suggest that the market takes into account the costs of leasing property such as the loss of collateral and increase in bankruptcy risks.
The results also indicate that there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of companies in the UK that lease property. The propensity to lease varies by industry.
Companies with the highest leasing propensity are in the IT hardware, software and computer services sectors while those with the lowest propensity to lease are in the automobile and parts, household goods and textiles industries. The propensity to lease is also subject to size and growth effects as companies that lease their property are likely to be large, to have high growth rates and high proportional R & D expenditures. These results suggest that leasing allows companies to grow faster. Companies that have a higher propensity to lease have lower financial gearing (leverage). This implies that leasing allows companies to reduce their reported leverage because part of the leasing (operating leases) is off-balance sheet. Liquidity ratios are higher in companies that lease property. Companies that lease appear to hold more cash and have better cash conversion periods than freehold companies, suggesting that leasing based companies manage their operating cycles more efficiently. I also find that freeholdbased companies hold high inventories, implying that leasing allows companies to be more efficient in the use of their real estate assets, namely warehouses. Finally, the results indicate that the corporation tax liability of companies that lease is not significantly lower than those that report freehold property, suggesting that companies do not necessarily lease heir property because they cannot claim tax allowances.
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypotheses that companies lease their property assets to avoid reporting high leverage, to mitigate the agency conflicts and to increase their efficiency, but they do not provide support for the tax hypothesis. To my knowledge there is no other study that dealt directly with this issue. The comparison of these results with studies that focused on the leasing of plant and machinery reveals interesting differences. For example, Lasfer and Levis (1998) report that leasing of plant and machinery is much more confined to large rather than to small companies and that while large companies lease to reduce their tax liability, small companies recur to leasing to finance their growth potentials and to complement their debt financing. The differences in the motives for leasing plant and machinery and leasing property can result from the characteristics of these two assets. In particular, small companies are likely to lease their plant and machinery but to own freehold property to minimize their costs of borrowing as property, unlike depreciable plant and machinery, can be used as loan collateral.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 reports the results and the conclusions are in section 5.
Theoretical background
Leases take several different forms, the most important of which are operating leases and straight financial or capital leases. While these types of leasing differ in their legal, tax and accounting treatments, they are all viewed, in the theory of finance, as part of the financing decisions of the firm. The economic benefits of leasing can be derived from the firm's choice of leasing relative to borrowing and acquiring the asset. The essence of leasing is reflected in the proposition that leasing provides customized financing with potentially unique cash flow and tax features. Unlike borrowing, the ownership of the asset remains with the lessor and the 5 lessor can deduct tax allowances generated by the leased equipment. Where the lessee and the lessor have the same tax status, borrow and lend at the same rate of interest, and have similar expectations regarding the salvage value of the asset, there is no advantage to leasing over purchasing. In practice, these perfect capital market conditions are not satisfied, resulting in a number of rationales for leasing.
The theory of financial leasing has initially relaxed the first assumption and focused on the differential tax position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rational for leasing.
If the lessee is unable to utilize the capital allowances and interest expense deductions from corporation tax because of the high operating losses and/or other tax allowances, it can partially utilize the tax incentives associated with asset purchase by leasing the asset. More recently, the remaining two assumptions were relaxed and other rationales for leasing have been developed. For example, if the lessor is able to place a higher salvage value on the asset than would the lessee, lease financing could provide additional economic benefit over purchasing the asset. The tax-based analysis was also extended to consider economies of scale in structuring lease contracts and the cost of managing cash flows in the presence of default risk and interest rate uncertainty, conservation of working capital, ease of obtaining credit by firms with poor credit ratings and flexibility and convenience. These benefits could make previously rejected projects based on the borrow-and-buy decisions acceptable.
The following sections detail these leasing motives, namely, taxation, debt capacity, agency costs and introduce a new hypothesis relating to efficiency gains through leasing.
A. Taxes and leasing
Traditionally, the theory of financial leasing has focused on the differential tax position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing. 2 The fundamental argument is that, if a firm is not in a full tax-paying position, purchasing and depreciating an asset may be costly as no or lower capital or depreciation tax allowances are usable. However, by leasing the asset, the lessor would claim the tax allowances, the benefits of which could be transferred indirectly to the lessee through lower lease payments. Thus, while the after-tax NPV of the project if the asset is purchased could be negative, the leasing could reverse this position.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show companies are likely to refrain from using debt financing when their debt capacity to fully use the tax deductions is limited. Empirically, MacKie-Mason (1990) study incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis to find that, in the US, tax allowances affect significantly the choice between issuing debt or equity. Similarly, Graham (1996) reports that the incremental use of debt by US companies is affected by the simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses, investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax. Similarly, using UK data, Lasfer (1995) shows that companies with low effective corporate tax rates are less likely to use debt and those that are tax exhausted use significantly less debt than tax-paying firms.
Under this framework, Lewis and Schallheim (1992) Furthermore, in this model, the benefits from leasing are realized even if the marginal tax rate is the same for the lessee and the lessor.
Empirical evidence provided to date on the influence of taxes on leasing is mixed. For example, Finucane (1988) shows that tax-related factors are not significantly associated with the level of leasing of US firms. These results may, however, be driven by the fact that Finucane looked at capital' leases, as defined by FASB Statement No 13, which are not likely to be affected by tax factors because they are treated by the Internal Revenue Service as installment sales contracts for tax purposes. Mehran and Taggart (1999) use the ratio of reported tax less change in deferred tax over earnings before interest and tax to estimate the impact of taxes on leasing for a sample of 134 large US companies over the period 1979-80.
They find that the coefficient of this variable is not significant. These results are likely to be driven by the lower number of firms analysed and the shorter sample period. Other studies find a strong evidence of tax effects. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that US companies with a high proportion of tax-loss carry forward rely more on lease finance. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) construct two alternative proxies for a firm's tax status. The first is the ratio of tax expense over pre-tax income. The second is a dummy variable equal to one for firms that reported in their financial statements tax-loss carry forward. These firms are considered to be tax exhausted and thus unable to take full advantage of the tax benefits of ownership. These two measures are found to be significant, suggesting that capitalized leases are used more heavily by US firms for which the tax-benefits of ownership appear low. Graham et al (1996) 7 compute the marginal effective corporate tax rates of a sample of US companies. They consider only operating leases which are likely to be true leases for tax purposes. They show that a change in the marginal tax rate from 0 to 46 percent will, on average, result in 19 percent decrease in the firm's ratio of operating leases to firm value and in a 7 percent decrease in the ratio of capital leases to firm value.
In the UK, a number of studies show that taxation affects the decision to use leasing.
For example, Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) 
B. Leasing and corporate debt capacity
At the same time as leasing is related to taxes, the finance theory has considered leasing as a substitute for corporate borrowing. Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) and Franks and Hodges (1978) view leasing and long-term debt as fixed, contractual obligations. Both leasing and debt reduce firm's debt capacity, and, as a consequence, greater use of lease financing should be associated with less reliance on debt.
However, the empirical evidence contradicts this approach. A number of studies show that a greater use of leasing tends to be associated with more debt financing. For example, using a sample of 92 US firms in 1973 , Bowman (1980 finds that firms with high levels of outstanding debt engage also in leasing activity. Ang and Peterson (1984) find a positive and statistically significant relationship between leasing activity and debt ratios for 600 US firms over the 1976 -81. Finucane (1988 also shows that, in the US, leasing and debt financing are positively correlated and that firms in certain industries, such as air transport and retailing, and those with lower bond ratings lease more frequently.
The above studies, however, fail to control for the underlying factors that determine debt capacity. Smith and Wakeman (1985) argue that the results of Ang and Peterson (1984) probably reflect the difficulties of controlling for debt capacity. They argue that firms with higher debt capacity may also have other characteristics that make leasing relatively attractive. In particular, firms with certain asset characteristics are likely to have greater debt capacity, and, as such, they can afford to use more lease and debt financing.
A number of more recent studies have analysed leasing decisions after controlling for such considerations. Marston and Harris (1988) analyze the contemporaneous changes in leasing and changes in debt financing across a sample of US firms. They find these two variables to be inversely related, confirming that lease and debt are substitutes. However, they find that firms that employ lease financing typically use higher levels of debt compared to firms that do not use leasing. Krishnan and Moyer (1994) hypothesize that leasing reduces bankruptcy costs in comparison to financing with ordinary debt while having all the advantages of secured debt. Under these considerations leases should be more widely used by riskier, less established firms. They find that lessee firms in the US have lower retained earnings, high growth rates, lower coverage ratios, higher debt in their capital structure higher operating risk and lower z-score than non-lessee firms. Their evidence suggests that as bankruptcy potential increases, lease financing becomes an attractive financing option.
Nonetheless, their analysis ignores operating leases and examines the use of capital leases, which are not driven by taxes in the US. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) analyze the intensity to use both operating and capital leasing in the US. They hypothesize that a firm's propensity to lease is a function of the type of capital required and the extent of leasing-related transaction costs associated with such assets. They controlled for these unobservable factors by analyzing a firm's propensity to lease relative to other firms in its own industry. They find that leasing propensity, defined as the ratio of operating and capital leases over book value of fixed assets, is substantially higher for lower-rated, non-dividend-paying and poor-cash firms. Their results suggest that, in the US, leasing is used extensively by firms that are likely to face relatively high premiums for external funds. Using UK data, Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) report that the degree of leasing and debt financing are negatively related, as predicted by the theory.
Lasfer and Levis (1998) also show that companies that are likely to face higher premiums on external funding use leasing. However, this depends on the size of the firm.
They report that large leasing companies have large gearing and relative proportion of bank loan and overdraft in their debt. These companies appear to lease to reduce their interest costs.
In contrast, for small companies, leasing is a substitute for debt financing.
A number of other studies provide survey evidence on the relationship between leasing and debt financing. For example, Bathala and Mukherjee (1995) report that for small firms, debt and leasing are complementary. Mukherjee (1991) asked 103 chief financial officers of large firms (Fortune 500) whether they viewed debt and leasing as substitutes, complements or independent financing instruments. While 22 of the respondents felt that the relationship is complementary and 31 saw the two as independent, 47 reported that lease and debt financing are substitutes. These arguments lead to the following testable hypothesis:
If leasing is used as a substitute for debt finance, then lessee companies should be less geared than non-lessee firms.
C. Leasing and agency costs
Another set of arguments for the determinants of leasing focus on agency and contracting costs. The main argument is that if a company borrows to finance a particular project, there is a possibility that the funds may be used to finance other more risky projects or to be distributed as dividends to shareholders. Myers (1977) refers to such cases as the asset substitution problem. Given that the contacts or covenants cannot cover all contingencies, lenders are likely to refrain from financing some positive NPV projects that are difficult to monitor. As a result, debt financing may lead to an underinvestment problem.
Leasing is likely to overcome these agency costs of debt. For example, the model of Stulz and Johnson (1985) predicts that under the agency framework some profitable projects will not be undertaken by a firm which can use only equity or unsecured debt to finance them but will be undertaken if they can be financed with secured debt or leasing. Smith and Wakeman (1985) identified other cases where leasing reduces agency costs. They provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease-versus-purchase decision and suggest that taxes are important in identifying potential lessees and lessors but they are less important in identifying the specific assets leased. They suggest that, under the agency framework, firms are unlikely to lease assets that are highly specific to the organization because that would create agency conflicts between the lessor and the lessee. They predict that leasing is more likely to occur if the value of the asset is not specialized to the firm. In this case, firms are likely to lease generic office facilities than more firm-specific production and research and development facilities. They also predict that leasing is likely to occur if the lessor has market power and if the lessor has comparative advantage in asset disposal. Similar conclusions are reached by Williamson (1988) who concludes that assets that are easily redeployable, i.e., assets with resale value and not firmspecific, are likely to be leased.
Empirically, the extent to which leasing is determined by the resolution of potential agency conflicts is difficult to test. The main reason relates to the lack of data on firm's asset types. However, previous studies have used a number of proxy variables to measure the impact of asset type on leasing propensity. The first proxy variable is the industry factor.
Assets used by firms in a particular industry could easily be identifiable and their suitability for leasing could be assessed. For example, Finucane (1988) and Krishnan and Moyer (1994) find that leasing activity in the US is more prevalent in certain industries than in others. In particular, firms in transportation, services and wholesale and retail trade are more likely to use leasing. This suggests that assets leased in these industries, such as aircraft and retail space, are easily redeployable. Moreover, Finucane (1988) shows that firms with mortgage secured notes or bonds are more likely to use leasing. This suggests that firms with assets that make good collateral are also likely to have assets conductive to leasing.
The second proxy variable is the split of a firm's market value into assets in place and the proportion of the value that is accounted for by future growth opportunities. There are a number of mechanisms that can be used to reduce the agency problems between managers and shareholders. Under the agency cost framework, firms with a higher proportion of growth opportunities should use less debt financing to mitigate the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977; Stulz and Johnson, 1985) . Empirically, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that, in the US, firms with greater growth opportunities, as measured by book-to-market ratio, rely more heavily on lease financing. Barclay and Smith (1995) also use the special case of regulated companies to test for the effect of investment opportunities on leasing. They argue that regulation reduces the possibility for corporate underinvestment because the regulator oversees these firms' investments decisions. They find that regulated firms in the US, such as gas and electric utilities and telecommunications, use lower proportion of capitalized leases but higher proportions of long-term debt and ordinary debt.
An alternative mechanism used to reduce the agency problem is the ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Smith and Wakeman (1985) consider the potential role of ownership structure as a determinant of leasing activity. They predict that leasing is more likely to occur if the firm is closely held because leasing acts as a risk reduction mechanism for such firms, especially if the lessor has a comparative advantage in disposing of the asset in the second hand market. Empirically, Mukherjee (1991) shows that, in the US, the desire to lay off obsolescence risk is one of the motives for leasing. Mehran and Taggart (1996) find that US firms with high proportions of insider ownership engage more in leasing.
The third proxy variable used for asset type is firm size. Firm size is a measure of firms' ability to redeploy assets internally. Large diversified firms are less likely to lease assets because they are less concerned with external redeployment possibilities. Consistent with these arguments, Barclay and Smith (1995) , Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and Lasfer and Levis (1998) find that small firms are more likely to lease their assets. These arguments lead to the following testable hypothesis:
If leasing is used to resolve the agency conflict, then lessee companies should have higher growth opportunities and more re-deployable assets than non-lessee firms.
D. Leasing and efficiency
In general, real estate is the largest asset type in the balance sheet. According to Bootle (2002) UK private sector commercial property (office, retails and industrial) is worth about £400bn and represents 34% of total business assets. In addition, unlike other fixed assets, property is not depreciable and usually reported in the balance sheet at revaluation value. If the property is leased, the rental payment in the profit and loss account for the interest and the capital repayments. However, if the property is owned by the company on freehold basis, they do not incur any expenses apart from the maintenance and repairs. As a result, companies that own freehold property may not consider it as a costly asset and they are less likely to use it efficiently. For example, Bootle (2002) shows that companies that lease their property use it more efficiently as they save up to 12% on space per employee. At company level data on the occupancy rate is not available. 4 Instead I test the hypothesis that companies that lease their property use it more efficiently by holding lower amount of stock of raw materials and finished goods. In contrast, companies that own freehold property will hold large stocks if their property is considered as non-cost asset. This issue has not been tested in the previous literature and will highlight the extent to which leasing leads to operating efficiency. These arguments lead to the following testable hypothesis:
H 04 : If leasing is used to increase efficiency then leasing companies should hold a lower stock (inventory) than companies that own their freehold property.
E. The market valuation of Leasing
The above analysis suggests that there are costs and benefits of leasing which are likely to be more pronounced for the case of property given its importance in firm's balance sheet. Companies are likely to create value if they lease their property to save in taxes, to increase their efficiency, to reduce their leverage when property is reported off balance sheet and to use cash that would have been tied up in freehold property to finance good investment projects. However, companies are likely to benefit from owning freehold property as they can use it as collateral for their loans, sell it in case of bankruptcy to pay back debt holders and shareholders, use it as a buffer stock in case of financial distress, alter it when necessary, and use it as a hedge against inflation. In addition, companies that own freehold property will not be committed to rent and rent rises, will benefit from property capital appreciation, and they will be able to inflate their earnings as freehold property is not depreciable. Given these costs and benefits, it is an empirical question as to whether leasing creates or destroys value.
This issue has not been directly analysed in the previous literature. Instead, most previous studies have focussed more on the market valuation of sales and leaseback announcements using the event study methodology. For example, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1990) analyse the market reaction to corporate sale-and-leaseback announcements made by 59 US companies. They show that on the announcement date, share prices increase abnormally by 0.85% (t = 1.98), suggesting that financial market participants view the sales and leaseback of property as a positive event. Given that sales-and-leaseback is similar to raising debt, the market perception is even higher as the abnormal returns are negative when companies raise debt. Thus, companies gain significantly by opting for sales-and-leaseback of their property rather than the 'borrow and buy' alternative. In addition, this positive market valuation implies that the market views the benefits of leasing more highly than the costs. In other words, the loss of collateral and the potential increase in the cost of debt that follow after the property asset is sold are more than counteracted by the benefits of generating cash to use in other parts of the business and becoming more efficient in the use of leased property.
While these event studies focus on the short-term market reaction, the question still remains as to whether, in the long-run, leasing companies create more value than freehold companies.
I, therefore, set up the following testable hypothesis:
H 05 : The market valuation of companies that lease their real estate assets is higher than that of companies that own their freehold assets if the benefits of leasing outweigh the costs. The tests are undertaken for the sample as a whole and by splitting companies in the sample into various sub-sample periods, sectors and size groups. 
where L X is the mean proxy variable in leasing propensity group L and X is the mean of the proxy variable X for the whole sample and L σ is the standard error or the variable in the leasing propensity group L.
In the second part I perform a multivariate analysis, intended to examine the relationship between leasing propensity and the control variables as follows: Where LP is leasing propensity, Size is the log of year-end market value of equity, Gr is the growth rate in turnover, Lev is the ratio of long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. I use the ratio of cash over current assets and stock (inventory) over current as a measure of Efficiency. I expect companies that lease their property to be liquid (high cash over current assets) because their cash is not tied up in the property and to use more efficiently their warehouses, i.e., to have a low level of stock.
Finally, I proxy for the firm's tax position using profit margin (profit before interest and tax over turnover) and tax liability over profit before tax. I control for industry impact by deducting the industry medians from each of these variables. I test for robustness of these variables using total assets for size, new investments in tangible fixed assets over tangible fixed assets for growth, total debt over total assets for leverage, and cash conversion period defined as stock holding period plus debtors' payment period less creditors' payment period.
Finally, I test the hypothesis that leasing creates value by relating leasing propensity to the market to book ratio. The results are checked for robustness using Tobin's Q (market value of equity plus book value of debt over total assets) and market-to-sales (market value of equity plus book value of debt over turnover). These ratios are usually used in the literature to measure shareholder value creation (e.g., Faccio and Lasfer, 2000 , Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996 , Lins and Servaes, 1999 . 
Empirical Evidence
In this section the aforementioned hypotheses are tested. I show the extent to which the propensity to lease depends on agency costs, leverage, efficiency and tax considerations.
A. Leasing and the resolution of the agency conflicts
Under the agency conflicts large and companies with high growth opportunities are likely to suffer from the agency conflicts between managers and debtholders. Table 2 reports the differences across leasing propensity in size and growth. The results indicate a relative monotonic relationship between the leasing propensity and firm's size with large companies preferring to lease their property while small companies are more likely to own freehold property. These results are striking and indicate that unlike other tangible assets where companies that lease are more likely to be small (e.g., Lasfer and Levis, 1998), the property leasing propensity is positively related to firm size. There are two implications of these results. First, given that the average market value of equity of companies that lease their property is significantly higher than that those that own freehold property, the results could indicate that companies that lease their property perform well. However, the results do not hold solely for market value of equity as they apply also to measures that might not directly linked to performance such as total assets, turnover and number of employees. 5 Alternatively, the results could indicate that new companies that came to the market in recent years, particularly in the Internet boom, are much more likely to report leased property. This argument would suggest that young companies are expected to rely on leased property while older companies will report freehold property, because of cash shortage. However, the classification of the companies in the sample into age groups did not indicate that young companies are much more likely to report leased property than older companies. Table 2 reports also a strong positive relationship between leasing propensity and growth in sales, suggesting that high growth companies are more likely to lease their property.
These results are checked for robustness using alternative measures of growth. For example, the average value of R&D/sales of companies that report only freehold property is 0.64% compared to 15.56% for companies that rely only on leased property. The probability of investing in R&D is also higher in companies that rely on leasing. In particular, there are only 15.7% of companies that report only freehold property that invest in R&D compared to 26.3% of companies that use only leased property. Figure 2 indicates that companies that report only freehold property invest less in their tangible fixed assets comparing to companies that rely on leasing. The investment rate in tangible fixed assets for the first group is 12.2% compared to 22.6% for companies that lease all their property. Finally, I find that although the means PE ratios are not monotonically distributed across leasing propensity groups, the medians tend to show clearly that high leasing propensity companies have high PE ratios. These results are not reported for space considerations.
Overall the results indicate that companies that own property are likely to be mature while companies that lease their property tend to be at growth stage. The findings are consistent with Lasfer and Levis (1998) who show that high growth firms are more likely to lease. Given that these companies are likely to suffer from assets substitution problem, the results imply that leasing reduces agency conflicts.
There are a number of implications of these results. First as the finance theory predicts, growth companies are likely to suffer significant agency conflicts related to asset substitution problems. Thus such growth companies are less likely to find cheap borrowing to acquire their assets. Instead, they rely on leasing to finance their growth. However, since growth appears to move relatively monotonically with leasing propensity and that it is not only companies that lease all their property that have high growth, the results could also indicate that companies chose to rely on leased property strategically rather than as a response to borrowing constraints. In order to assess fully this claim, I analyze in the next section the impact of leverage on leasing propensity. Table 2 reports the differences in leverage across leasing propensity groups. The finance theory predicts that if companies use leasing as a substitute for debt financing then leasing intensity should be negatively related to leverage. The results clearly indicate that companies that own their property have significantly lower leverage than companies that lease their property. The results using leverage based on book value of equity or total debt over total assets are similar and suggest that leasing is a substitute for debt financing. I also find but I do not report that firms that report only freehold property have significantly larger proportion of short-term debt relative to total debt compared to companies that report only leased property. This implies that companies that report only leased property have a higher proportion of long-term debt than companies that own freehold property. This could suggest that leasing companies have reached their optimal debt level and cannot borrow additional funds at low cost. Thus, it is cheaper for these companies to lease their property than to borrow and buy it. Finally, I find that the proportion of debt that is secured for leasing companies is substantially lower than that of the freehold companies. On average, 74.1% of total debt of freehold companies is secured while only 61.3% of the debt of leasing companies is secured. Similarly, the median value of secured debt of freehold companies is significantly lower than that of the leasing companies. These results have two implications. First they could suggest that freehold companies use property as collateral while leasing companies do not have any tangible fixed assets to use as collateral. 6 Alternatively, the results could suggest that freehold companies are not well managed. Thus most of their debt needs to be secured. These results, may, however, be driven by the size effect as freehold companies are small and thus, more likely to have a large of their debt short-term. This issue is explored more fully below using the multivariate analysis technique to account for the simultaneous effects of all the factors that drive firms to lease.
B. Leasing propensity and firm's leverage

C. Leasing propensity and efficiency
The relationship between property leasing and efficiency is tested through firm's liquidity position. This hypothesis cannot be measured using accounting rates of return because companies that own freehold property do not account for the cost of using property in their profit and loss accounts. The data on the occupancy rate and the returns generated on property is not available. Instead I chose to measure efficiency through the analysis of liquidity. In particular, I focus on the extent to which the differences across companies in the holding periods of stocks of raw materials and finished goods and cash conversion periods are related to the leasing propensity. I test the hypothesis that companies minimize the holding costs of their stock to use more efficiently their property. In this case, leasing propensity will be negatively related to stock holding period. Such optimal stock holding period will improve the cash holding period of companies that lease their property. First, I analyze the proportion of cash in the current assets by leasing propensity. The results clearly indicate that the cash position of the leasing companies is substantially higher than that of companies that report only freehold property. The average cash over current assets of companies that report only leased property (L = 100%) is 47% compared to 12% for companies that report only freehold property. Similarly, the median values also indicate the high cash position of the leasing companies. In addition, the analysis of the median shows that the distribution of the relative cash position is monotonically distributed across the leasing propensity groups: the higher the leasing propensity, the better is the firms' cash position.
These results imply that leasing firms do not have their cash tied up in their property. They can use this cash to finance their operating activities as well as their growth opportunities without recurring to costly external finance.
In Table 2 , I also use stock over current assets as an alternative proxy for efficiency.
The results clearly indicate that leasing companies have a tendency to carry low stock levels.
For example, the average proportion of stock in the current assets of the freehold companies is 33% compared to 22% for the leasing companies (t statistics of the differences in means is 11.55). Similarly, the median value of stock over current asset of the freehold companies is 31% compared to 18% for the leasing companies. This ratio is relatively monotonically distributed across the leasing propensity, suggesting that the higher the leasing propensity the lower the level of stock carried by companies. These results provide an indication that freehold companies are not likely to value the cost of carrying their stock, because they do not treat their freehold property as a costly asset. In contrast, leasing firms carry relatively lower stock, precisely because they value the cost of carrying stock as they treat leased property as a costly asset.
I test for robustness using the cash conversion period, i.e., the amount of time (expressed in days) required to sell stock and collect cash from trade debtors, less the number of days credit extended by suppliers. This ratio is computed as the sum of the stock holding period and the debtors-payment period less the creditors-holding period. 7 The results reported in Figure 2 indicate that this variable decreases from 75 days for companies with zero leasing to 50% when L = 100%. These results suggest that leasing firms are more likely to manage efficiently their operating cycle and are more sophisticated in the management of their fixed assets than companies that own freehold property.
Finally, Table 2 reports the distribution of firms' tax payments. The average effective tax rate of the companies that lease all their property is 19% compared to 27% for the freehold companies. The differences in means between the two groups are not significant. In terms of medians, companies that lease all their property appear to have significantly lower effective corporation tax rates. However, the differences across the remaining groups are not large. The results suggest that by leasing their property, companies do not reduce substantially their tax liability.
However, the differences in the tax liability may be driven by companies making losses. In order to investigate this issue, I report in Table 2 the average profit margin. The results indicate that leasing companies are relatively more profitable. I then analyse the proportion of companies in each leasing groups that make losses. I find that the high leasing group companies are much more likely to have losses than the freehold companies, suggesting that the analysis of the effective corporation tax alone may not provide the full picture of the extent to which leasing companies reduce their tax liability. At the same time, the losses made by the high leasing propensity companies are likely to be driven by the relatively high growth opportunities of the leasing sample, documented in the previous sections. In the multivariate analysis section, I take into consideration taxes and profitability as well as growth opportunities and other factors to assess the extent to which leasing companies benefit from leasing by paying lower taxes. Table 3 reports the results of the multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the leasing propensity, the ratio of leased property (leasehold and operating leases on property) over leased and freehold property. All the regressions include industry dummies, which are not reported. Column (1) indicates that leasing companies are substantially larger than freehold companies. The coefficient of the log of market value of equity is positive and highly significant, suggesting that large companies are much more likely to lease their property than smaller companies. The results replicated using alternative measures of size all lead to the same conclusions. For example, the coefficient of log of total number of employees is 0.003 (t = 2.33).
E. Multivariate Analysis
Column (2) shows that the coefficient of cash/current assets is positive and significant indicating that the higher the leasing propensity the higher the cash holding while regression (3) shows that the coefficient of stock/current assets is negative and significant confirming that leasing companies hold a lower stock than freehold companies. Regression (4) provides the results of the full model. The coefficient of the growth rate in turnover is positive and significant. The coefficient of R&D intensity, R&D/Sales, (not reported) is also positive and significant (0.009, t = 4.96). These results confirm that, even after taking into consideration industry factors through dummy variables, leasing companies have substantially higher growth rates in turnover than freehold companies. Leverage and the tax variable are negative but not significant. Overall the results indicate that companies in the UK are not homogeneous but their behaviour is highly dependent on their leasing propensity. In particular, when they lease their property, they are likely to grow faster than companies that rely on only freehold property. They are also likely to have high cash position and to manage more efficiently their stock, partly because their property (such as warehouse) is costly.
F. Leasing propensity and value creation
In this section I test whether the benefits of leasing real estate assets documented above are reflected in shareholder value creation and whether the market perceives this strategy positively. I assess the extent to which leasehold property companies have a higher market-tobook value (MB) than freehold companies. Table 4 reports the distribution of value creation variables by leasing propensity. The results show that for the sample as a whole, the mean and median market-to-book ratios are 3.63 and 1.76, respectively. The distribution of the mean and median market-to-book across leasing propensity is relatively monotonic, increasing from 1.86 (median 1.23) for companies that hold only freehold property to 4.69 (median 2.06) for companies that report only leased property. The differences in means and medians between these two extreme groups are statistically significant (t = -4.94 and Mann Whitney p-value is 0.000), suggesting that the value of companies that report only freehold property is statistically lower than that of companies that report only leased property. The results are also not limited to these extreme cases. For example, the market-to-book of companies that report less than 20% leased property (0%<L<20%) of 1.68 is statistically lower than the 4.07 of companies that reported leased property of between 80 and 100% (80%<L<100%). These results suggest that as companies increase their proportion of leased property, they tend to increase value creation to their shareholders, probably by using more efficiently their property assets.
The results based on Tobin's Q and market-to-sales ratios also indicate that companies that report leased property generate higher value than companies that report only freehold property. For example, the mean (median) Tobin's Q of L = 0% is 1.14 (0.89) compared to 2.2 (1.14) for companies that report 100% leased property. The differences in means and medians are statistically significant (t = -8.22 and MW p-value = 0.000). The respective values for market-to-sales (M/S) are 1.67 (0.77) and 6.81 (0.86) with t of differences in means of -8.53 and MW p-value of 0.000. These results imply that the high value creation of leasing companies does not appear to be specific to a particular proxy variable used to measure value.
I have also checked these results using the one year cumulative abnormal returns and the results show that leasing companies perform better than freehold companies. However, the analysis shows that companies with leasing propensity between 60% and 100% perform better than the rest of the sample. These results indicate that the relationship between firm value and leasing propensity is not likely to be linear and companies appear to have an optimal level of leasing.
G Is there an optimal level of leasing propensity?
Although these results imply that companies can increase their value as they increase their leasing propensity, they do not indicate whether companies should all have 100% leasing
propensity. The results presented in the previous section point to the fact that, in some case, companies that have a lower than 100% leasing propensity perform better than other companies. In order to account for this observation, I include the squared value of leasing propensity (Propensity 2 ) in the market-to-book ratio regression. This method allows for the testing of the non-linear relationship between firm value and leasing propensity and to determine the optimal level of leasing. I find a positive coefficient of the Propensity variable and the negative coefficient of Propensity 2 . These results indicate that the relationship between firm value and leasing propensity is inverse U-shaped. This relationship is plotted in 
Conclusions
The study contrasts the benefits and the costs of leasing property. The analysis starts by documenting the trend in the number of companies in the UK that recur to leasing rather than owning freehold property and shows that, over These results are further substantiated by the analysis of the determinants of leasing.
The results indicate that the decision to lease property is driven by some strategic considerations. In particular, the results indicate that companies lease their property to finance their growth prospects and to conserve liquidity, namely cash. These results are consistent with previous findings on equipment leasing. However, unlike leasing plant and machinery, companies that lease their property appear to be significantly larger than companies that own freehold property. Leasing allows companies to use more efficiently their property. In particular, leasing companies hold less stock than companies that own freehold property.
The market appears to value the benefits of leasing property. Companies that report only leased property are found to generate higher returns to their shareholders. These results are consistent with the positive market reaction on the announcement of property disposals.
However, at the same time, the market appears to value also the costs of leasing property such as the loss of collateral and increase in bankruptcy costs. The findings indicate that companies should aim for an optimal level of leasing of about 65% to maximise the returns they generate to their shareholders. Forth, the research has focussed on the analysis of the trade-off between owning freehold and leasing property. Thus, I assume that firms will adjust their freehold property according to the levels of the explanatory variables such as growth. However, given the relatively high transaction costs, property is likely to be a long-term investment. An ongoing current research attempts to explore further these issues together with the causality question by analysing specifically the determinants of the trades in freehold and leased property. Note: Leasing propensity (L) is the ratio of leased assets (leasehold and operating leases on property) over the sum of freehold and leased property. All is for all companies in the sample. Growth Sales is turnover in year t less turnover in year t-2 over t-2. Leverage is long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity. TA is for total assets. t L=0 -L=100 /MW are the t-statistics and the Mann Whitney (MW) p-values for differences in means and medians between freehold only (L = 0%) and leasehold only companies (L = 100%). χ2 (7) is the Chi-Squared to test for differences across the leasing propensity groups, critical χ2(7) = 20.28. The sample includes 2,343 UK quoted companies over the period 1989 to 2002, resulting in 17,862 pooled time-series and cross-sectional observations. *** Significant at 0.01 level. The table reports the mean and median values of value variables by leasing propensity, L, defined as the ratio of leased assets (leasehold and operating leases on property) over the sum of freehold and leased property. MB is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity over book value of equity. Q is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity and total debt over total assets. MS is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity and total debt over sales. Table 6 Multivariate analysis of the relationship between leasing propensity and value creation
The table reports the results of the regression results of various value variables on leasing propensity L, defined as the ratio of leased assets (leasehold and operating leases on property) over the sum of freehold and leased property. MB is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity over book value of equity. Q is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity and total debt over total assets. MS is the ratio of the year-end market value of equity and total debt over sales. Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976); and Brick, Fung and Subrahmanyam (1987) .
3 See also, Fawtrop and Terry (1975) , Sykes (1976) , Tomkins, Lowe and Morgan (1979) Taylor and Turley (1985) for additional evidence.
4 Bootle (2002) also finds that although property is as essential to a company's operations as workers and machines, it is rarely mentioned in the boardroom and many companies do not have an accurate assessment of their property costs. The owner-occupiers waste a significant amount of space and lose up £9.5bn a year in potential cost saving. These companies could also sell and take a lease on the property and release cash to invest or reduce debt.
5 For example I find that the mean (median) total assets of companies with L = 0% is £52m (£26m) compared to £832m (£58m) for L = 100% (t = -15.41, MW = 0.00, χ2(7) = 7,158).
Similarly, the mean (median) number of employees of companies with L = 0% is 645 (277) compared to 5,132 (435) for L = 100% (t = -26.65, MW = 0.00, χ2(7) = 1,993). These results are not reported for space considerations but they are available upon request. 6 Other tangible assets such as plant and machinery are usually depreciable, thus not used frequently as collateral.
7 Stock holding period is the ratio of stock (inventory) over the cost of goods sold times 365.
Debtors payment period is the ratio of trade debtors over sales times 365. Creditors payment period is the ratio of trade creditors over costs of goods sold times 365.
